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Abstract
We study the relationship between the cognitive load manipulation and strategic so-
phistication. The cognitive load manipulation is designed to reduce the subjects cognitive
resources that are available for deliberation on a choice. In our experiment, subjects are
placed under a large cognitive load (given a di¢ cult number to remember) or a low cogni-
tive load (given a number which is not di¢ cult to remember). Subsequently, the subjects
play a one-shot game then they are asked to recall the number. This procedure is re-
peated for various games, where a new number is given for each game. We nd a nuanced
and nonmonotonic relationship between cognitive load and strategic sophistication. This
relationship is consistent with two e¤ects. First, subjects under a high cognitive load tend
to exhibit behavior consistent with the reduced ability to compute the optimal decision.
Second, the cognitive load tends to a¤ect the subjects perception of their relative stand-
ing in the distribution of the available cognitive resources. The net result of these two
e¤ects depends on the strategic setting. Our experiment provides evidence on the litera-
ture which examines the relationship between measures of cognitive ability and strategic
sophistication.
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1 Introduction
Models of strategic sophistication have greatly improved our understanding of play in games.1
These models posit that subjects exhibit heterogenous sophistication in their thinking of the
game. An open question relates to the origin of these strategic levels and whether they arise
from a fundamental trait of the subjects. A natural candidate for the source of the strategic
levels is the measured cognitive ability of the subject. This has prompted researchers to
investigate the relationship between measured cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.2
However, one di¢ culty in employing measures of cognitive ability is that subjects with
di¤erent measures of cognitive ability are possibly also di¤erent in other ways. As such, it
might not be possible to distinguish between an alternate hypothesis that an unobserved
characteristic is responsible for the level of strategic sophistication, and cognitive ability is
merely correlated with this characteristic. Here, rather than measure cognitive ability, we
manipulate the cognitive resources available to the subject via cognitive load. Cognitive load
experiments often direct subjects to make a decision in one domain while simultaneously
manipulating the cognitive resources available to reect on the decision.
The cognitive load manipulation is designed to occupy a portion of the working memory
capacity of the subject. Working memory can be conceptualized as the cognitive resources
available to temporarily store information so that it can be used in decision making. Therefore,
working memory is instrumental in the execution of deliberative thought.3 Several studies
have found that measures of cognitive ability are positively related to measures of working
memory capacity.4 Further, reducing the available working memory of a subject via cognitive
load, reduces the cognitive resources available for deliberation, and can be regarded as similar
to the condition of having a diminished cognitive ability. Additionally, given the within-
1For instance, Stahl and Wilson (1994,1995), Nagel (1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001),
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004). See Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri
(2013) for an updated overview of the eld.
2See Bayer and Renou (2012), Burnham et al. (2009), Brañas-Garza, Paz Espinosa, and Rey-Biel (2011),
Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013), Devetag and Warglien (2003), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2010), and
Gill and Prowse (2012).
3See Alloway and Alloway (2013).
4For instance, see Conway, Kane, and Engle (2003), Kane, Hambrick, and Conway (2005), Oberauer et
al. (2005), and Süßet al. (2002). See Burgess et al. (2011) and Cole et al. (2012) for recent advances in
understanding the neurological basis of this relationship.
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subject design of our experiment, we are able to observe the behavior of each of the subjects
in di¤erent cognitive load treatments. As a consequence, our results are not possibly driven
by unobserved characteristics which are only related to cognitive ability.5
Although we expected that the cognitive load manipulation would produce uniformly less
strategically sophisticated behavior, we nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship between
cognitive load and strategic sophistication. In fact, our results are consistent with recent
advances in the literature. While much of the research on the source of strategic sophistication
focuses on measures of cognitive ability, recent research emphasizes the role of the perception
of the strategic sophistication of the opponent. For instance, Agranov, Potamites, Schotter,
and Tergiman (2012) nd that the strategic sophistication of the subject is related to the
perceived strategic sophistication of their opponents.6
In our experiment, we directed subjects to play various one-shot games while under a
cognitive load manipulation. In particular, they played ten 3  3 games, a variation of the
11 20 game (Arad and Rubenstein, 2012), and a variation of the beauty contest game (Nagel,
1995). We note that our version of the 11   20 game is relatively simple, the beauty contest
is relatively complicated, and the 3 3 games have various levels of complexity.
The subjects played these games under either a low or a high cognitive load. Subjects in the
low load were directed to commit a three digit binary number to memory and subjects under
a high load were directed to commit a nine digit binary number to memory. Subsequently,
the subjects were asked to recall the number. Additionally, some treatments also informed
the subjects of the load of their opponent.
Through a single manipulation of the available cognitive resources, we observe behavior
consistent with two e¤ects. First, subjects under a high cognitive load had di¢ culty making
the computations associated with optimal play. In this regard, high load subjects can be
considered less sophisticated than low load subjects. Second, subjects under a high load
behaved in a way which is consistent with the view that they were aware that they were
5Although we note that the research nds that the cognitive load manipulation is more e¤ective on subjects
with a higher measure of cognitive ability (Carpenter et al., 2013).
6Also see Alaoui and Penta (2014), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), and Slonim (2005). On the other
hand, de Sousa, Hollard, and Terracol (2013) nd evidence that many subjects are not sensitive to the apparent
sophistication of their opponents.
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relatively disadvantaged in the distribution of available cognitive resources. Therefore, high
load subjects can be considered to be more sophisticated than low load subjects. We nd that
the net result of these two e¤ects depends on the strategic setting.
The e¤ect of the constrained ability to make calculations dominates the other e¤ect when,
in the relatively complicated beauty contest game, the high load subjects selected less strategic
actions. This is consistent with the view that the diminished ability of the high load subjects
to compute the optimal strategy in the relatively complicated game. We also see that the
ability to best respond to stated beliefs, a measure of the sophistication of their actions, and a
measure of the sophistication of the beliefs of their opponents actions of the high load subjects
in the 3 3 games are di¤erentially less sensitive to the complexity of the game, as measured
by the number of their own dominated strategies. These results are consistent with the view
that the high load subjects were less strategically sophisticated.
On the other hand, the e¤ect of the reduction in their perceived standing in the distribution
of available cognitive resources dominates the other e¤ect in our version of the 11  20 game,
which is relatively uncomplicated. Here, high load subjects selected a more strategic response,
consistent with the expectation that they were paired with a more cognitively able subject.
We also nd that high load subjects, better than low load subjects, conditioned their behavior
on the information regarding the load of their opponent. These results are consistent with the
view that high load subjects were more strategic than low load subjects.
Overall, we nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship between available cognitive
resources and strategic sophistication. We hope that our ndings are helpful in the e¤orts to
improve the models of strategic sophistication.
1.1 Related literature
The economics literature increasingly regards the brain as an object worthy of study in that,
subject to its limitations and heterogeneity across subjects, it is the source of economic behav-
ior. This line of inquiry has investigated topics ranging from the e¤ects of sleep on strategic
behavior (Dickinson and McElroy, 2010, 2012), to optimal search patterns (Sanjurjo, 2012a,
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2012b), to neurological studies of the brain during choice (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009, 2012),
to novel elicitation methods designed to measure the reasoning of subjects (Agranov, Caplin,
and Tergiman, 2013; Burchardi and Penczynski, 2014; Chen et al., 2010; Crawford, 2008). In
particular, there is a growing literature which investigates the relationship between measured
cognitive ability and economic preferences7 and the relationship between measured cognitive
ability and behavior in games.8 To the extent that subjects under a high cognitive load are
similar to the condition of having a low cognitive ability, our results provide evidence on the
relationship between cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.
There is an extensive literature on the cognitive load manipulation in nonstrategic settings.
The research nds that subjects under a high cognitive load are more impulsive and less
analytical (Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2003), they are more risk averse and are more
impatient (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2013), they make more mistakes on a forecasting
task (Rydval, 2011), they exhibit less self control (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward and Mann,
2000, Mann and Ward, 2007), they fail to process available information (Gilbert, Pelham, and
Krull, 1988; Swann et al., 1990), they perform worse on gambling tasks (Hinson, Jameson,
and Whitney, 2002), they perform worse on spatial judgment tasks (Du¤y, Smith, Allred, and
Crawford, 2014), they make di¤erent choices in allocation decisions (Cornelissen, Dewitte, and
Warlop, 2011; Hauge et al., 2009, Schulz et al., 2014), and they have di¤erent evaluations of
the fairness of outcomes (van den Bos et al., 2006).9 This literature nds that the behavior
under a cognitive load is consistent with the condition that the subjects have fewer cognitive
resources available for deliberative thought.
On the other hand, there does not exist many instances of studies of the strategic behavior
7See Andersson et al. (2013), Arruñada, Casari, and Pancotto (2012), Beauchamp, Cesarini, and Johan-
nesson (2011), Benjamin et al. (2013), Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004), Brañas-Garza, Guillen, and
Lopez del Paso (2008), Branstätter and Güth (2002), Burks et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2013), Cokely and
Kelley (2009), Dohmen et al. (2010), Frederick (2005), Millet and Dewitte (2007), and Oechssler, Roider, and
Schmitz (2009).
8See Ballinger et al. (2011), Baghestanian and Frey (2012), Bayer and Renou (2012), Brañas-Garza, Garcia-
Muñoz, and Hernan Gonzalez (2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2011), Carpenter et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2010),
Gill and Prowse (2012), Grimm and Mengel (2012), Jones (2011), Jones (2008), Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and
Rosa-García (2014), Palacios-Huerta (2003), Proto, Rustichini, and Soanos (2014), Putterman, Tyran, and
Kamei (2011), Rydval (2011), Rydval and Ortmann (2004), and Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011).
9Deck and Jahedi (2013) study several e¤ects at a time and nd that subjects under a cognitive load are
less patient, more risk averse, perform worse on arithmetic tasks, and are more prone to anchoring e¤ects.
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which employ the cognitive load manipulation. To our knowledge, Milinski and Wedekind
(1998), Roch et al. (2000), Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011), Buckert, Oechssler, and
Schwieren (2013), Du¤y and Smith (2014), and Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013) are the
only such examples. We note that all but the last of these are not designed to investigate
models of strategic sophistication. For instance, Buckert, Oechssler, and Schwieren (2013)
nd that high load subjects in a repeated Cournout oligopoly game are more likely to select
the less sophisticated imitation heuristic. Milinski and Wedekind (1998) nd that high load
subjects in the repeated prisoners dilemma game employ less complicated strategies than
low load subjects. Du¤y and Smith (2014) nd that low load subjects in a nitely repeated
multi-player prisoners dilemma game exhibit more defection near the end of play and they
are better able to condition their strategy on previous outcomes. However, these studies do
not lend themselves to the study of strategic sophistication, as the games are repeated and
the subjects receive feedback about the strategic outcomes.
In contrast to the other studies, Carpenter et al. (2013) induce a di¤erential cognitive load
in subjects then observe the strategic behavior of the subjects. The subjects played a sequential
game that can be solved by backwards induction. The subjects also provided both actions and
beliefs in the beauty contest game. The authors nd that subjects under a high cognitive load
are less strategic in that they are less able to perform backwards induction. Additionally, the
authors nd that high load subjects believe that their beauty contest opponents would select
a higher number and the authors observe a larger deviation from the best response to these
beliefs. Our most comparable result is that we nd that high load subjects are less strategic
in that they select a higher number in the beauty contest. While our beauty contest results
coincide with those of Carpenter et al., we also note that we nd that, depending on the type
of the game, high load subjects can be considered to be more sophisticated.
We also note that there are methodological di¤erences between Carpenter et al. and
our paper. First, Carpenter et al. employs a between-subjects design, whereby subjects are
exclusively observed in a single cognitive load treatment. This design introduces possible
di¤erences in payments across treatments, since the memorization task was incentivized. By
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contrast, we employ a within-subjects design, whereby each subject played some games under
a high load and other games under a low load. Therefore, the di¤erences which we observe
are not possibly driven by di¤erences in the payments across the cognitive load treatments.
In our view, this paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we provide ad-
ditional evidence that the cognitive load manipulation a¤ects strategic behavior. Second, we
nd that the relationship between strategic sophistication and available cognitive resources
is nuanced and nonmonotonic. In fact, this nuanced relationship is achieved through only a
single cognitive load manipulation. We view our results as providing indirect evidence which
could inform the research on the relationship between measures of cognitive ability and strate-
gic sophistication. In particular, our results suggest that a lower measure of cognitive ability
will not necessarily produce less sophisticated behavior, because the ability to make compu-
tations and the perception of the relative standing in the ability to make computations have
opposite e¤ects on behavior.
2 Method
A total of 308 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were drawn from the
experimental economics subject pool at Rutgers University-New Brunswick and the sessions
were conducted in the Wachtler Experimental Economics Laboratory. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).10 Sessions lasted
from 60 to 75 minutes.
2.1 Specication of the games
We directed subjects to play a series of games: ten 3 3 games, an adaptation of the 11  20
game, and an adaptation of the beauty contest game. These games were used because they
provide di¤erent estimates of the strategic sophistication of the subjects. The subjects were
not given feedback about the outcomes of the games. The subjects were told that they would
be randomly and anonymously rematched in each of the games.
10The z-Tree code is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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First, we directed subjects to play 10 simultaneous action 3  3 games. These games are
simplied versions of games used by Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008), Rey-Biel (2008),
and Bayer and Renou (2012).11 In these games, each subject was matched with another
subject and both made a selection among three possible actions. In addition to selecting an
action, we also elicited the point beliefs of the subjects about the action of the other player.
Each of the 3  3 games has an original version (labeled A) and a transposed version of the
original game (labeled B). In other words, the A and B versions are strategically equivalent but
the roles have been switched. From the perspective of the games as specied in the appendix,
subjects played all 10 games as either a row or a column player. Therefore, each subject
played both roles in each of the 5 strategically equivalent games. We note that the game was
always presented so that the subject was the row player and the opponent was the column
player. As a result, every player selected among actions labeled Top, Middle, and Bottom,
and selected beliefs about the action of the opponent which were labeled Left, Center, and
Right. Throughout the experiment, 10 points were equivalent to $3:50. Correct beliefs were
rewarded with 4 points. See the appendix for a screenshot of the choice in the 3 3 games.
We also used a variant of the 11   20 game (Arad and Rubenstein, 2012). Subjects
were randomly matched with another subject and selected an integer between 1 and 10.
The subjects received the amount selected, where again 10 points were equivalent to $3:50.
However, the subject received a bonus of 10 points if they selected a number exactly one digit
lower than their opponent. Hereafter, we will refer to this game as the 1   10 game.
Finally, we employed a version of the beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995). Each subject
selected a half-integer between 0 and 10. The subject who selected the number closest to 2=3
of the average in the session received $30.
2.2 Memorization task
Before play in every game, the subjects were given up to 15 seconds to commit a number to
memory. The subjects were told that after the game, they would be asked for the number.
These numbers were always composed of a string of either 0 or 1, where the rst digit was
11See the appendix for the precise specication of the games used and a screen shot.
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always a 1. In the high load treatment, we required the memorization of a 9 digit string, for
example: 101110001. In the low load treatment, we required the memorization of a 3 digit
string, for example: 110. We employed a within-subject design whereby the subjects faced an
alternating load of high and low. Half of the subjects were given the high load rst, and half
were given the low load rst. A new number was randomly given in each of the games. The
subjects were not given feedback about the results of the memorization task.
2.3 Controlling for beliefs
Of the 308 subjects, 144 were given information about the load of their opponents in the 33
games and the 1   10 game.12 This took the form of a screen which stated that the other
player "will have to remember a: Big (Small) Number." Additionally, during the decision in
the 3 3 games, the subjects were also reminded of the load of their opponent.13 In order to
give subjects a consistent sequence of stimuli, prior to the beauty contest game, these subjects
were given a screen which stated that roughly 50% of the other subjects were given a big
number and roughly 50% were given a small number. In order to minimize the e¤ect of the
load on processing this information, the subjects were informed of the load of their opponent
prior to the memorization task.
2.4 Experimental timeline and details
Before the incentivized portion of the experiment, we provided four unincentivized tasks: two
practice memorization tasks and two simple addition tasks. First, the subjects were given two
unincentivized practice rounds with the memorization task, one with a large number and one
with a small number. Then, in order to illustrate the extent to which the loads can a¤ect the
ability to make basic computations, we provided a memorization number, then we directed
the subjects to sum two randomly selected integers between 11 and 40, then we asked for the
memorization number. The subjects performed this addition task under both a low and a
12For studies which have controlled for or manipulated the beliefs of the opponents, see Agranov et al.
(2012), Alaoui and Penta (2014), de Sousa, Hollard, and Terracol (2013), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2010),
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), and Slonim (2005).
13See the appendix for a screen shot.
9
high cognitive load.
Subsequently, we provided the subjects with instructions on 3 3 games.14 We directed
the subjects to play the 3 3 games under a di¤erential cognitive load. Before each of these
games, we gave the subjects the memorization number, then we presented the game, then we
asked for the memorization number. The instructions stated that, should the subject perform
X of the 10memorization tasks correctly in the 33 games then the computer would randomly
select the maximum of either 0 or X   7 outcomes of the 3 3 games for payment.
Between each of the ten 3  3 games, the subjects were forced to take a 20 second rest.
During this rest period, the subjects were not able a¤ect the screen which read, "Rest!!!
Because a new game will start soon." Also note that, across sessions, we randomized the
order in which the subjects were presented the 3 3 games.
After the 3 3 games, the subjects were directed to play the 1  10 game and the beauty
contest game, under the alternating cognitive load which continued from the previous stages.
The subjects were told that they would be paid the amount of the 1 10 game and the beauty
contest game only if the memorization task was performed correctly for both of these games.
Note that we did not load the subjects when they were reading the instructions for the 1  10
game and the beauty contest game.
After the beauty contest memorization task was completed, the subjects were directed to
indicate their gender, whether they are an economics major, whether they have taken a game
theory course, an optional estimate of their grade point average (GPA), and a rating of the
di¢ culty in recalling the large and the small memorization numbers. These di¢ culty ratings
were solicited on a scale of 1 ("Very Di¢ cult") to 7 ("Not Very Di¢ cult"). Subsequently, the
subjects were told their amount earned and they were paid in cash. The subjects earned an
average of $17:67 (SD = 6:11).
2.5 Discussion of the experimental design
Despite that Du¤y and Smith (2014) nd that their cognitive load manipulation a¤ects be-
havior, here we employ a di¤erent design. First, we employ a within-subject design, rather
14These instructions are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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than a between-subject design. This is notable because research suggests that the e¤ects of
the cognitive load manipulation can be lasting (Dewitte et al., 2005). In order to mitigate the
e¤ects of the load of previous rounds, we employed a mandatory rest-period between games.
Second, unlike Du¤y and Smith (2014), which employs a memorization number composed of
digits ranging from 0 to 9, we restrict attention to numbers composed exclusively of either 0
or 1. This design was intended to mitigate the interaction between the game payo¤ numbers
and the the memorization task numbers.
While we could observe that subjects were not able to employ any obvious memorization
aids (cell phones, writing the number on paper, etc.) we cannot say with certainty that no
subject used a memorization aid. For instance, with an appropriate positioning of the free
body parts (feet, legs, elbows, wrists, and ngers on left hand) one could possibly devise a code
to aid memorization. In our view, this possibility is not as advantageous as it rst appears.
This is because the subject must remember the code, and this will occupy cognitive resources.
So, while this remains a possibility, we do not regard it to be a serious problem.
Additionally, we designed the experiment so that the responses to the games were as simple
as possible. For instance, in the 3 3 games we elicited the point beliefs of the action of the
opponent rather than more sophisticated measures of beliefs. This procedure has a drawback
that our measures of beliefs are coarse. On the other hand, the task is su¢ ciently simple so
that the memorization task was not likely to a¤ect the ability to comply with the elicitation
procedure. Additionally, we elicited responses to the beauty contest, which were the 21 half-
integers between 0 and 10 rather than, as is more standard, the integers or real numbers
between 0 and 100. More generally, we designed the experiment so that every response in
the games took a di¤erent format than that required for the memorization task. In the 3 3
games, the 1  10 game, and the beauty contest game, the responses involved clicking on the
corresponding button, whereas the memorization task required entering a sequence of digits.
We employed a simplied version of the 3 3 games originally used by Costa-Gomes and
Weizsacker (2008), Rey-Biel (2008), and Bayer and Renou (2012). The original games have
integer payo¤s which range from 10 to 98. We employed a simplied version where payo¤s
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are integers which range from 1 to 11. This design was intended to reduce the computational
di¢ culty in deciding on an action.
We now discuss the equilibrium details of the games. The 3 3 games each have a single
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. The 1  10 game does not have a pure strategy equilibrium,
but has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In equilibrium, the player selects 10 with
probability 0:1, 9 with probability 0:2, 8 with probability 0:3, and 7 with probability 0:4.
The beauty contest game has a Nash Equilibrium where every player selects 0.15 Although
the 1  10 game has a mixed strategy equilibrium, the beauty contest is a more complicated
game. First, there are several opponents in the beauty contest game, whereas there is only a
single opponent in the 1  10 game. Second, the best response in the 1  10 game is obvious:
select one fewer than your opponent. This is in contrast to the beauty contest where the best
response is less straightforward. Finally, there are many decision rules in the beauty contest:
the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium or successive elimination of dominated strategies. By
contrast, in the 1   10 game there is only a single decision rule: select one fewer than your
opponent. This is because the game possesses neither a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium nor
a dominated strategy.
Finally, note that we do not load the subjects during the instructions of the 1 10 game and
the beauty contest game because this could reduce the comprehension of the instructions.16
3 Results
3.1 A preliminary look at the cognitive load e¤ects
The subjects reported a signicant di¤erence in the di¢ culty in recalling the large number
(M = 5:93, SD = 1:23) and the small number (M = 6:83, SD = 0:52) according to a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, W = 6798:5, p < 0:001. There are also signicant di¤erences
between the treatments in the length of time which they spent committing the number to
15A reviewer pointed out that there is another equilibrium which results from the discrete nature of the
action space. In this equilibrium, every player selects 0:5.
16We acknowledge that this design leaves open the possibility that the subject could decide on an action
during the instruction stage, thereby reducing the e¢ cacy of the cognitive load.
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memory. Recall that the subjects were given up to 15 seconds in order to commit the number
to memory.17 The low load subjects had signicantly more of the 15 seconds remaining
(M = 12:80, SD = 2:96) than the high load subjects (M = 4:83, SD = 4:27), according to a
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test Z = 46:70, p < 0:001. The subjects were each given
12 incentivized memorization tasks, 6 as high load and 6 as low load. Subjects in the low load
were correct in 99:03% (1830 of 1848) of the attempts and the subjects in the high load were
correct in 96:75% (1788 of 1848) of the attempts.18
Despite these di¤erences between the treatments, we do not nd evidence that the subjects
in the high load treatment were unusually impaired. Recall that we posed 2 simple, unincen-
tivized arithmetic questions to each subject, one under a high load and one under a low load.
Given 616 arithmetic questions, only 21 incorrect responses were given, 14 under the high load
and 7 under the low load. These are not signicantly di¤erent (2(1) = 2:42, p = 0:12). Thus,
we do not nd evidence that the high load signicantly impaired the subjects.
3.2 The 3 3 games
We rst examine the relationship between cognitive load and a basic measure of the sophis-
tication: whether the subjects played a best response to their stated beliefs. In the analysis
which follows, the dependent variable obtains a value of 1 if the subject played a best response
to their beliefs, and a 0 otherwise.
Since the 3  3 games vary in their complexity, we include a two such measures. One
independent variable species the number of the subjects own dominated strategies. This
variable ranges from 0 to 2. Another independent variable species the number of the domi-
nated strategies of their opponent. This variable also ranges from 0 to 2.
We account for the load by employing a high load dummy variable, which obtains a value
of 1 if the subject was under a high load and a 0 otherwise. Additionally, we include a dummy
17The z-Tree output specied the time remaining when the Click to Proceed button was pressed. However,
there were instances where the output suggested that the decision was made with 99999 seconds remaining.
This output seems to have occurred if the Click to Proceedbutton was pressed before the clock could begin.
In the stage in which the number was given to the subjects, we recoded the 3 instances of the 99999 output as
16, because 15 seconds were allotted.
18According to a chi-square test, these are signicantly di¤erent, 2(1) = 23:10, p < 0:001
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variable indicating whether the subject had taken a game theory course, whether the subject
reported being an economics major, and whether the subject is female. We refer to this
collection of variables as Demographics. We also account for self-reported GPA. Recall that
GPA is optional and only 216 of 308 subjects provided a response.
Finally, we include controls for the information given to the subject. In particular, we
control for the case where the subject was not given any information about their opponent,
whether the subject was told that their opponent was under a high load or whether the subject
was told that their opponent was under a low load. From this categorical variable, we are able
to determine the behavioral e¤ect of the information about the load of the opponent. We can
therefore estimate the di¤erence in behavior for subjects who were told that their opponent
was under a high load and those who were told that their opponent was under a low load.
We perform this di¤erence for three conditions: all subjects who were told the load of their
opponent, only high load subjects who were told the load of their opponent, and only low load
subjects who were told the load of their opponent. We present the estimates these di¤erences
at the bottom of the summary of the analysis.
Since we have 10 observations for every subject, we employ a repeated measures analy-
sis. We estimate an exchangeable covariance matrix, clustered by subject. In other words,
we assume a unique correlation between any two observations involving a particular subject.
However, we assume that observations involving two di¤erent subjects are statistically in-
dependent. The regressions are estimated using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE).
Since GEE is not a likelihood-based method, Akaikes Information Criterion is not available.
Therefore, we provide the Quasilikelihood information criterion (QIC).19 We summarize this
analysis in Table 1.
19For more on QIC, see Pan (2001).
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Table 1 Repeated measures regressions: Best response to stated beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:0551 0:0622 0:0607
(0:187) (0:188) (0:226)
Own dominated strategies 0:487 0:492 0:563
(0:0704) (0:0709) (0:0881)
Other dominated strategies  0:0421  0:0432  0:0779
(0:0591) (0:0597) (0:0757)
High load*Own dominated strategies  0:167  0:169  0:231
(0:076) (0:0765) (0:0907)
High load*Other dominated strategies 0:0327 0:0339 0:0295
(0:0891) (0:0900) (0:114)
Self-reported GPA     0:307
(0:124)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 3080 3080 2160
QIC 3812:39 3789:93 2639:42
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:344  0:349  0:388
opponent is low load (0:117) (0:117) (0:136)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:370  0:383  0:404
opponent is low load for high load subjects (0:151) (0:153) (0:185)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:317  0:315  0:373
opponent is low load for low load subjects (0:178) (0:179) (0:203)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, or the covariance estimates. Regressions (1)
and (2) have 3080 observations (308 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has
2160 observations (216 subjects in 10 periods). QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood
information criterion. The bottom three terms provide the estimates of the dif-
ferences in behavior from being informed that the opponent was high load or low
load. Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05, and  at p < 0:01.
In all three specications, the Own dominated strategies variable is positive and signicant.
In other words, subjects were more likely to best respond to their stated beliefs if there
was a larger number of own dominated strategies. Further, we nd that the High load-Own
dominated strategies interaction is negative and signicant in every specication. This implies
that the high load subjects were less sensitive to the changes in the complexity of the game,
as measured by the number of their dominated strategies. Also note that we nd a positive
relationship between Self-reported GPA and best responding to stated beliefs.
Additionally, we note that the e¤ect of the information of the load of the subjects is negative
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and signicant for all three estimates in each specication. This implies that subjects were
less likely to best respond to their beliefs if they were told that the opponent was under a high
load rather than if they were told that their opponent was under a low load. This is perhaps
a consequence of the subjects having a lower condence in their beliefs for high load rather
than low load opponents. Finally, note that this di¤erence is signicant for high load subjects
at 0:05 and signicant for low load subjects at only 0:1.
Next we explore the relationship between cognitive load and a commonly used measure of
strategic sophistication, L2. In the strategic sophistication literature, L1 subjects are dened
to be those best responding to the least sophisticated L0 types. Typically in matrix games,
the L0 types are assumed to select each available action with an equal probability. In our
setting, this would imply that the subject selects each action with probability 13 . Further, L2
types best respond to L1 types.
In the analysis below, the dependent variable, L2 classication, obtains a value of 1 if the
subject selected an action consistent with L2 behavior, and a 0 otherwise. Other than the
dependent variable, the analysis is identical to that summarized in Table 1. This analysis is
summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2 Repeated measures regressions: L2 classication
(1) (2) (3)
High load  0:0075  0:0006  0:0614
(0:176) (0:177) (0:214)
Own dominated strategies 0:612 0:618 0:666
(0:0668) (0:0673) (0:0842)
Other dominated strategies 0:105 0:106 0:0427
(0:0591) (0:0596) (0:0741)
High load*Own dominated strategies  0:179  0:180  0:232
(0:0767) (0:0774) (0:0920)
High load*Other dominated strategies 0:0600 0:0608 0:121
(0:0837) (0:0845) (0:1080)
Self-reported GPA     0:217
(0:140)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 3080 3080 2160
QIC 3905:04 3886:15 2718:96
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:247  0:251  0:240
opponent is low load (0:105) (0:106) (0:121)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:289  0:300  0:337
opponent is low load for high load subjects (0:145) (0:145) (0:174)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:205  0:202  0:143
opponent is low load for low load subjects (0:159) (0:160) (0:188)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, or the covariance estimates. Regressions (1)
and (2) have 3080 observations (308 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has
2160 observations (216 subjects in 10 periods). QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood
information criterion. The bottom three terms provide the estimates of the dif-
ferences in behavior from being informed that the opponent was high load or low
load. Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05, and  at p < 0:01.
For games which are less complex, as measured by the number of the subjectsown dom-
inated strategies, the subjects were more likely to select the L2 action. However, high load
subjects were less sensitive to the number of their own dominated strategies. We also note
that, unlike the previous analysis, here the GPA variable is not signicant.
We are also able to examine the e¤ect of the information about the load of the opponent.
The estimates for the high load subjects are negative and signicant. In other words, high
load subjects were less likely to play the L2 action if they were told that their opponent was
under a high load rather than a low load. On the other hand, the estimates for the low load
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subjects are not signicant. In other words, there is no evidence that the low load subjects
conditioned their action on the information of the load of their opponent.20
Now rather than analyze actions, we analyze beliefs. One measure of the sophistication
of beliefs is whether the subject expressed beliefs that their opponent would play their Nash
equilibrium action. In the analysis below, the dependent variable, Nash beliefs, obtains a value
of 1 if the subject reported the belief that their opponent would play their Nash action, and a
0 otherwise. Other than the dependent variable, the analysis is identical to that summarized
in Tables 1 and 2. We summarize this analysis in Table 3.
Table 3 Repeated measures regressions: Nash beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:258 0:265 0:237
(0:235) (0:236) (0:282)
Own dominated strategies 0:310 0:311 0:330
(0:0546) (0:0550) (0:0627)
Other dominated strategies 0:908 0:913 0:900
(0:0744) (0:0749) (0:0913)
High load*Own dominated strategies  0:198  0:199  0:217
(0:0838) (0:0843) (0:0983)
High load*Other dominated strategies 0:152 0:153 0:149
(0:0945) (0:0949) (0:1164)
Self-reported GPA     0:403
(0:148)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 3080 3080 2160
QIC 3684:46 3677:35 2590:92
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:082  0:086  0:186
opponent is low load (0:112) (0:112) (0:128)
Informed that opponent is high load minus  0:291  0:302  0:355
opponent is low load for high load subjects (0:153) (0:154) (0:193)
Informed that opponent is high load minus 0:127 0:129  0:0166
opponent is low load for low load subjects (0:168) (0:169) (0:192)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, or the covariance estimates. Regressions (1)
and (2) have 3080 observations (308 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has
20We note that the above analysis with Nash equilibrium actions, rather than L2 actions, is qualitatively
similar to that presented above, however the estimates of the e¤ect of the information of the load of the
opponent is not signicant for either high or low load subjects.
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2160 observations (216 subjects in 10 periods). QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood
information criterion. The bottom three terms provide the estimates of the dif-
ferences in behavior from being informed that the opponent was high load or low
load. Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05, and  at p < 0:01.
As in the previous two analyses, we nd evidence that subjects were sensitive to the number
of their own dominated strategies and that high load subjects were di¤erentially insensitive
to this feature. Additionally, we nd that the GPA variable is positive and signicant.
We also analyze the e¤ect of the information about the load of their opponents on their
stated beliefs. We nd evidence that high load subjects were less likely to express Nash beliefs
if their opponent was under a high load rather than under a low load. However, we do not
nd evidence of the analogous relationship for low load subjects.
We summarize our ndings from the 3  3 games. We nd that high load subjects were
less able to make computations as they were less sensitive than low load subjects to the
complexity of the game, as measured by the number of their own dominated strategies. This
lack of sensitivity was measured by the likelihood of best responding to their stated beliefs,
the likelihood of selecting the L2 action, and the likelihood of reporting the belief that their
opponent would play their Nash equilibrium action. In this regard, the high load subjects
were less sophisticated than low load subjects. On the other hand, we nd that high load,
not low load subjects, better conditioned their responses on the information about the load of
their opponent. In this regard, the high load subjects were more sophisticated than low load
subjects.
3.3 The 1  10 game
Recall that the 1   10 game is relatively simple and provides a straightforward measure of
strategic sophistication. It would seem natural that the least sophisticated subject (L0) would
select 10. The subject who best responds to the L0 subjects (L1) would select 9. The subject
who best responds to L1 subjects (L2) would select 8, and so on. As such, the response is
negatively associated with the strategic sophistication of the subject.
Now we examine behavior in the 1   10 game. Recall that in one condition, which we
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refer to as the No information condition, subjects were not told the load of their opponent.
In the other condition, which we refer to as the Information condition, subjects were told the
load of their opponent. As the response in the 1   10 game was bounded above at 10 and
below at 1, we perform tobit regressions with the action as the dependent variable, subject
to these bounds.21 We include a dummy variable indicating whether the 1   10 game was
played under a high load. We also consider the demographic variables and the self-reported
GPA. In the rst two regressions, we restrict attention to the No information condition. In
the last two regressions, we restrict attention to the Information condition. In the Information
regressions, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the subject was told that their
opponent was under a high load, and the interaction of this dummy with their own load. We
summarize this analysis in Table 4.
Table 4 Tobit regressions: Choice in the 1  10 game
No information Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:631  0:526  0:606  0:767
(0:286) (0:308) (0:493) (0:604)
Self-reported GPA   0:210   0:610
(0:391) (0:561)
Told opponent high load     0:00985  0:195
(0:491) (0:611)
Told opponent high load*High load     0:570 0:872
(0:696) (0:867)
Demographics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 164 112 144 104
-2 Log Likelihood 597:84 383:06 546:42 395:19
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 1. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual de-
mographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1 and  indicates
signicance at p < 0:05.
In the No information regressions, the High load variable is negative and signicant. This
implies that in the sessions where the subjects were not given information about the load of
21We run tobit regressions since 28 of the 164 subjects in the No information condition selected the upper
bound of 10 and 2 selected the lower bound of 1. Additionally, 29 of the 144 subjects in the Information
condition selected the upper bound and 1 selected the lower bound.
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their opponent, high load subjects selected a more sophisticated response. However, in the In-
formation regressions, the High load variable is not signicant. Therefore, we cannot conclude
that there is a relationship between the load and behavior in the Information condition.
We also note that the GPA variable is not signicant in either treatment. From this we
infer that 1   10 choice is not associated with a measure of cognitive ability. Also, in the
Information regressions, the variables related to the load of the opponent are not signicant.
Therefore, we do not nd evidence that the information of the load of the opponent a¤ected
behavior.
Whereas Table 4 presents an analysis restricted to one of the two information conditions,
below we consider them together. As we did not nd evidence that information about the
opponents load was related to behavior, we do not include it in the analysis summarized
below. However, we do include a variable indicating whether the decision was made in the
Information condition or not. We summarize this analysis in Table 5 below.22
Table 5 Tobit regressions: Choice in the 1  10 game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:477  0:624  0:641  0:537
(0:223) (0:305) (0:304) (0:363)
Self-reported GPA       0:411
(0:336)
Information condition    0:168  0:205  0:197
(0:316) (0:314) (0:362)
Information condition*High load   0:315 0:353 0:218
(0:446) (0:445) (0:520)
Demographics No No Y es Y es
Observations 308 308 308 216
-2 Log Likelihood 1155:01 1154:51 1148:44 789:02
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 1. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual de-
mographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1 and  indicates
signicance at p < 0:05.
Again, we note that the GPA variable is not signicant. Additionally, the variables as-
sociated with the Information condition are not signicant. However, we nd evidence that
22We run tobit regressions because 57 of the 308 subjects selected the upper bound of 10 and 3 selected the
lower bound of 1.
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the subjects under a high load gave a signicantly lower response in the 1   10 game. In
regressions (1), (2), and (3), the High load variable is negative and signicant. To the extent
that smaller responses are associated with a greater strategic sophistication, this is consistent
with the contention that the high load subjects were more strategic than low load subjects in
the 1  10 game.
3.4 The beauty contest game
Recall that lower responses in the beauty contest are associated with greater strategic sophis-
tication. Also recall that choice in our beauty contest was bounded above by 10 and below
by 0. Therefore, we run tobit regressions with choice in the beauty contest as the dependent
variable, subject to these bounds.23 In the information condition for the beauty contest, the
subjects were simply reminded of the distribution of the loads within the session. As a result,
for the Information condition regressions, we do not include a variable indicating the load
of their opponent. The analysis is otherwise equivalent to that summarized in Table 4. We
summarize this analysis in Table 6.
Table 6 Tobit regressions: Choice in the beauty contest game
No information Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load 0:625 0:933  0:716  0:762
(0:384) (0:432) (0:329) (0:382)
Self-reported GPA    2:076    0:0842
(0:547) (0:507)
Demographics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 164 112 144 104
-2 Log Likelihood 742:74 490:19 600:92 431:48
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 0. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual
demographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:01.
23Despite that in our sample, only 8 subjects selected the upper bound and none selected the lower bound,
we run tobit regressions. We do so in order to facilitate the comparision to the analysis of the 1  10 behavior.
Further, the tobit analysis is similar to that with an OLS specication. The OLS analysis is available from
the corresponding author upon request.
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In regression (2) of the No Information regressions, the High load variable is positive and
signicant. This suggests that subjects in the No Information condition under the high load
were less strategic than subjects under a low load. We also note that the GPA variable in the
No Information regression is negative and signicant. In regressions (3) and (4), the High load
variable is negative and signicant. This suggests that subjects in the Information condition
under high load were more strategic than subjects under a low load. We nally note that the
GPA variable is not signicant in the Information regressions.
In order to get an overview of all of the data, as with Table 5, we run an analysis of
the sessions together. Therefore, we perform an analysis nearly identical to that presented in
Table 5. We summarize this analysis in Table 7.
Table 7 Tobit regressions: Choice in the beauty contest game
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:655 0:644 0:788
(0:356) (0:357) (0:418)
Self-reported GPA      1:057
(0:387)
Information condition 0:354 0:328 0:267
(0:368) (0:368) (0:432)
Information condition*High load  1:316  1:321  1:467
(0:520) (0:520) (0:598)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 308 308 216
-2 Log Likelihood 1366:33 1362:66 941:87
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 0. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the individual
demographics variables. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:05, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:01.
First, we note that GPA is negative and signicant. This implies that higher GPA subjects
selected a more strategic response in the beauty contest game. We also note that the High
load variable is positive and signicant in all three specications. Additionally, we note that
the High load-Information condition interaction is negative and signicant. This suggests
that high load subjects in the Information condition were more strategic than were high load
subjects in the No Information sessions. This is consistent with view that the information
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about the distribution of the cognitive load was used by the high load subjects but not by the
low load subjects. In other words, here again we nd evidence that high load subjects better
used information than the low load subjects.
4 Conclusion
We have described an experiment where subjects played a sequence of games designed to
measure their strategic sophistication while under a di¤erential cognitive load. These games
included ten 3 3 games, the 1  10 game, and the beauty contest game. Through our single
cognitive load manipulation we observed a nuanced relationship between available cognitive
resources and strategic sophistication. This behavior is consistent with two e¤ects. First,
subjects under a high cognitive load had di¢ culty in making the computations associated
with optimal play. Second, subjects under a high load were aware that they were relatively
disadvantaged in the cognitive ability distribution. The net result of these e¤ects depended
on the strategic setting.
We see the rst e¤ect dominating the second e¤ect when, in the relatively complicated
beauty contest game, the high load subjects played less strategically.24 This behavior is
consistent with the diminished ability of subjects to compute the optimal strategy in this
complicated setting. Additionally, we see this e¤ect in that the subjects in the 33 games were
less sensitive to the complexity of the game, as measured by the number of their own dominated
strategies. We observe this di¤erential sensitivity in the likelihood of best responding to stated
beliefs, the likelihood of observing L2 behavior, and the likelihood of stating beliefs that their
opponent will play their Nash equilibrium action.
On the other hand, we see the second e¤ect dominating the rst e¤ect when, in the
relatively uncomplicated 1 10 game, the subjects selected a more strategic response, expecting
to be paired with a more cognitively able subject. We also nd that high load subjects, better
than low load subjects, conditioned their behavior on the load of their opponent. For instance
in the 3 3 games, high load subjects made more use of the information of the load of their
24 In support of our contention that the beauty contest is more complicated than the 1  10 game, we note
that GPA is related to choice in the beauty contest but not in the 1  10 game.
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opponents than did the low load subjects. Also in the beauty contest game, high load subjects
who were reminded of the distribution of the load of their opponents selected a more strategic
action than the low load subjects who were not reminded of the distribution. These results
are consistent with the contention that high load subjects were more strategic than low load
subjects.
We hope that this research is helpful in suggesting improvements in existing models of
strategic sophistication. Our evidence suggests that constraints on cognitive resources can
a¤ect the computations involving optimal behavior but also the perception of the subjects
relative standing in the distribution of cognitive resources. Our research corroborates previous
research that these two e¤ects are important in the study of games. In particular, our results
suggest that a lower measure of cognitive ability will not necessarily produce less sophisticated
behavior, particularly when the ability to make the necessary computations is not a binding
constraint.
We also hope that this research will encourage the use of the cognitive load manipulation
in any setting in which cognition plays a crucial role in behavior. Perhaps the most obvious
application of cognitive load is in the rational inattention literature.25 Rational inattention
models assume that decision makers are unable to process all available information. However,
decision makers optimally allocate their limited attention. It would seem protable to inves-
tigate these models in the laboratory, by manipulating the limits of attention via cognitive
load.
We acknowledge that there is much work to be done on this topic. For instance, we were
not able to observe the order in which the subjects provided their action and their beliefs in the
33 games. In the future, it could be protable to observe if there is a relationship between the
cognitive load manipulation and the order of the selection of actions and beliefs. We also hope
to learn whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect of not soliciting beliefs. Perhaps the solicitation
of beliefs prompts the high load subjects to be aware of the strategic considerations, where
that would possibly not occur if beliefs were not solicited. We also do not know if a di¤erent
25See Sims (2003), Reis (2006), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), Wiederholt (2010), Bordalo, Gennaioli,
and Shleifer (2014), Dahremöller and Fels (2012), and Persson (2012). See Cheremukhin, Popova, and Tutino
(2014) for an experiment involving rational inattention.
25
means of controlling for beliefs would yield lead to qualitatively similar behavior. Finally,
we are interested to learn the implications of a more di¢ cult high load (more than 9 binary
digits) and a less di¢ cult low load (less than 3 binary digits).
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Appendix
In the games below, 10 points are equivalent to $3:50. Games 1A and Game 1B: both players
have 2 dominated strategies. The game is adapted from Game 1 of Bayer and Renou (2012).
Game 1A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 4 5; 7 3; 6
Middle 6; 8 4; 9 1; 2
Bottom 7; 1 2; 5 2; 4
Game 1B
Left Center Right
Top 2; 8 3; 1 8; 7
Middle 6; 6 4; 3 9; 5
Bottom 5; 4 1; 1 7; 3
Games 2A and 2B: one player has a dominated strategy and the other player has two. The
game is adapted from Game 3 of Bayer and Renou (2012).
Game 2A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 8 3; 5 1; 9
Middle 9; 2 5; 3 6; 4
Bottom 4; 1 7; 6 2; 8
Game 2B
Left Center Right
Top 4; 5 6; 3 7; 7
Middle 3; 9 9; 8 2; 4
Bottom 5; 6 10; 1 9; 2
Games 3A and 3B: one player has two dominated strategies, the other player does not
have any dominated strategies. The game is adapted from Game VS1R of Rey-Biel (2008).
Game 3A
Left Center Right
Top 1; 9 2; 6 4; 3
Middle 4; 4 5; 4 5; 4
Bottom 7; 3 7; 5 6; 8
Game 3B
Left Center Right
Top 10; 2 2; 10 7; 11
Middle 7; 3 6; 4 7; 10
Bottom 6; 6 1; 7 9; 8
Games 4A and 4B: one player has one dominated strategy, other player does not have a
dominated strategy. The game, adapted from Game VS2R of Rey-Biel (2008), is dominance
solvable.
Game 4A
Left Center Right
Top 6; 6 4; 8 4; 9
Middle 4; 8 11; 3 3; 5
Bottom 1; 10 10; 6 3; 8
Game 4B
Left Center Right
Top 11; 1 1; 8 7; 5
Middle 4; 8 4; 8 1; 11
Bottom 6; 5 5; 7 2; 5
Games 5A and 5B: neither player has a dominated strategy. The game is adapted from
Game VSNDR of Rey-Biel (2008).
Game 5A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 6 2; 6 1; 11
Middle 4; 6 7; 6 3; 6
Bottom 2; 7 2; 5 4; 4
Game 5B
Left Center Right
Top 3; 10 5; 5 3; 9
Middle 4; 9 2; 9 4; 9
Bottom 9; 5 3; 8 2; 7
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Screen indicating the load of the opponent:
28
The screen during 3 3 games without information of the load of the opponent:
29
The screen during 3 3 games with information of the load of the opponent:
30
References
Agranov, Marina, Caplin, Andrew, and Tergiman, Chloe (2013): "Naive Play and the Process
of Choice in Guessing Games," working paper, California Institute of Technology.
Agranov, Marina, Potamites, Elizabeth, Schotter, Andrew, and Tergiman, Chloe (2012):
"Beliefs and Endogenous Cognitive Levels: an Experimental Study," Games and Economic
Behavior, 75(2), 449463.
Alaoui, Larbi and Penta, Antonio (2014): "Endogenous Depth of Reasoning," working
paper, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Alloway, Ross G. and Alloway, Tracy Packiam (2013): "Working Memory: An Introduc-
tion," inWorking Memory: The Connected Intelligence, Alloway, Tracy Packiam and Alloway,
Ross G. (eds.), Psychology Press, New York, 312.
Andersson, Ola, Tyran, Jean-Robert, Wengström, Erik, and Holm, Hakan (2013): "Risk
aversion relates to cognitive ability: Fact or Fiction?" IFN Working Paper No. 964.
Arad, Ayala and Rubinstein, Ariel (2012): "The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Level-k
Reasoning Study," American Economic Review, 112(7), 35613573.
Arruñada, Benito, Casari, Marco, and Pancotto, Francesca (2012): "Are Self-regarding
Subjects More Rational?" Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, working paper 611.
Baghestanian, Sascha and Frey, Seth (2012): "GO Figure: Analytic and Strategic Skills
are Separable," working paper, Indiana University.
Ballinger, T. Parker, Hudson, Eric, Karkoviata, Leonie, and Wilcox, Nathaniel T. (2011):
"Saving behavior and cognitive abilities," Experimental Economics, 14, 349374.
Bayer, Ralph and Renou, Ludovic (2012): "Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form
games," working paper, University of Leicester.
Beauchamp, Jonathan, Cesarini, David, and Johannesson, Magnus (2011): "The Psy-
chometric Properties of Measures of Economic Risk Preferences," working paper, New York
University.
Benjamin, Daniel, Brown, Sebastian, and Shapiro, Jesse (2013): "Who is Behavioral?
Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences," Journal of the European Economic Associa-
tion, 11(6), 1231-1255.
Ben-Ner, Avner, Kong, Fanmin and Putterman, Louis (2004): "Share and share alike?
Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of giving," Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology, 25, 581589.
Bordalo, Pedro, Gennaioli, Nicola, and Shleifer, Andrei (2014): "Competition for atten-
tion," working paper, Harvard University.
31
Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Garcia-Muñoz, Teresa and Hernan Gonzalez, Roberto (2012): "Cog-
nitive e¤ort in the Beauty Contest Game," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
83(2), 254260.
Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Guillen, Pablo and Lopez del Paso, Rafael (2008): "Math skills and
risk attitudes," Economics Letters, 99, 332336.
Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Paz Espinosa, Maria and Rey-Biel, Pedro (2011): "Travelerstypes,"
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 78, 2536.
Brandstätter, Hernann and Güth, Werner (2002): "Personality in Dictator and Ultimatum
Games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, 10(3), 191215.
Buckert, Magdalena, Oechssler, Jörg, and Schwieren, Christiane (2013): "Imitation under
stress," working paper, University of Heidelberg.
Burgess, Gregory C. Gray, Jeremy R., Conway, Andrew R.A., Braver, Todd S. (2011):
"Neural Mechanisms of Interference Control Underlie the Relationship Between Fluid Intel-
ligence and Working Memory Span," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 140(4),
674692.
Burchardi, Konrad B. and Penczynski, Stefan P. (2014): "Out Of Your Mind: Eliciting
Individual Reasoning in One Shot Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 3957.
Burks, Stephen V., Carpenter, Je¤rey P., Götte, Lorenz and Rustichini, Aldo (2009):
"Cognitive Skills Explain Economic Preferences, Strategic Behavior, and Job Attachment,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(19), 77457750.
Burnham, Terence C., Cesarini, David, Johannesson, Magnus, Lichtenstein, Paul and Wal-
lace, Björn (2009): "Higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p-beauty
contest," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72, 171175.
Camerer, Colin F., Ho, Teck-Hua, and Chong, Juin Kuan (2004): "A Cognitive Hierarchy
Model of Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 861898.
Cappelletti, Dominique, Güth, Werner, and Ploner, Matteo (2011): "Being of two minds:
Ultimatum o¤ers under cognitive constraints," Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(6), 940
950.
Carpenter, Je¤rey, Graham, Michael and Wolf, Jesse (2013): "Cognitive Ability and
Strategic Sophistication," Games and Economic Behavior, 80(1), 115130.
Chen, Chia-Ching, Chiu, I-Ming, Smith, John, and Yamada, Tetsuji (2013): "Too smart
to be selsh? Measures of cognitive ability, social preferences, and consistency," Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 90, 112122.
Chen, Chun-Ting, Huang, Chen-Ying and Wang, Joseph Tao-yi (2010): "A Window of
Cognition: Eyetracking the Reasoning Process in Spatial Beauty Contest Games," working
paper, National Taiwan University.
32
Cheremukhin, Anton, Popova, Anna and Tutino, Antonella (2014): "A Theory of Discrete
Choice with Information Costs," working paper, Federal Reserve of Dallas.
Cokely, Edward T. and Kelley, Colleen M. (2009): "Cognitive abilities and superior decision
making under risk: A protocol analysis and process model evaluation," Judgment and Decision
Making, 4(1), 2033.
Cole, Michael W., Yarkoni, Tal, Repov¼s, Grega, Anticevic, Alan, and Braver, Todd S.
(2012): "Global Connectivity of Prefrontal Cortex Predicts Cognitive Control and Intelli-
gence," Journal of Neuroscience, 32(26), 89888999.
Conway, Andrew R.A., Kane, Michael J., and Engle, Randall W. (2003): "Working mem-
ory capacity and its relation to general intelligence," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(12),
547552.
Coricelli, Giorgio and Nagel, Rosemarie (2009): "Neural correlates of depth of strategic
reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex," Proceeings of the National Academy of Science, 106
(23), 91639168.
Coricelli, Giorgio and Nagel, Rosemarie (2012): "The neural basis of bounded rational
behavior," Revista Internacional de Sociología, 70, 3952.
Cornelissen, Gert, Dewitte, Siegfried, and Warlop, Luk (2011): "Are Social Value Orienta-
tions expressed automatically? Decision making in the dictator game," Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 37(8), 10801090.
Costa-Gomes, Miguel A., Crawford, Vincent P. and Broseta, Bruno (2001): "Cognition and
Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, 69(5), 11931235.
Costa-Gomes, Miguel A., and Crawford, Vincent P. (2006): "Cognition and Behavior in
Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 96(5),
17371768.
Costa-Gomes, Miguel and Weizsacker, Georg (2008): "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-
Form Games," Review of Economic Studies, 75, 729762.
Crawford, Vincent P. (2008): "Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul. In The
Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, ed. Andrew Caplin and
Andrew Schotter. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 249280.
Crawford, Vincent P., Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. and Iriberri, Nagore (2013): "Structural
Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal
of Economic Literature, 51(1), 562.
Dahremöller, Carsten and Fels, Markus (2012): "Product Lines, Product Design and Lim-
ited Attention," working paper, Bonn Graduate School of Economics.
de Sousa, José, Hollard, Guillaume, and Terracol, Antoine (2013): "Non-strategic players
are the rule rather than the exception," working paper, Université Paris 1.
33
Deck, Cary and Jahedi, Salar (2013): "The E¤ect of Cognitive Load on Economic Deci-
sions." working paper, University of Arkansas.
Devetag, Giovanna and Warglien, Massimo (2003): "Games and phone numbers: Do short-
term memory bounds a¤ect strategic behavior?" Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 189202.
Dewitte, Siegfried, Pandelaere, Mario, Briers, Barbara, and Warlop, Luk (2005): "Cogni-
tive load has negative after e¤ects on consumer decision making," working paper, Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.
Dickinson, David L. and McElroy, Todd (2010): "Rationality Around the Clock: Sleep and
Time-of-Day E¤ects on Guessing Game Responses," Economics Letters, 108(2), 245248.
Dickinson, David L. and McElroy, Todd (2012): "Circadian e¤ects on strategic reasoning,"
Experimental Economics, 15(3), 444459.
Dohmen, Thomas, Falk, Armin, Hu¤man, David, and Sunde, Uwe (2010): "Are Risk
Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?" American Economic Review, 100(3),
12381260.
Du¤y, Sean, Smith, John, Allred, Sarah, and Crawford, L. Elizabeth (2014): "Cognitive
Load Increases Bias in Estimation," working paper, Rutgers University-Camden.
Du¤y, Sean and Smith, John (2014): "Cognitive Load in the Multi-player Prisoners
Dilemma Game: Are There Brains in Games?" Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Eco-
nomics, 51, 4756.
Fischbacher, Urs (2007): "z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experi-
ments," Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171178.
Frederick, Shane (2005): "Cognitive Reection and Decision Making," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19(4), 2542.
Georganas, Sotiris, Healy, Paul J., and Weber, Roberto A. (2010): "On the Persistence of
Strategic Sophistication," working paper, Ohio State University.
Gilbert, Daniel T., Pelham, Brett W., and Krull, Douglas S. (1988): "On Cognitive Busy-
ness: When Person Perceivers Meet Persons Perceived," Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54 (5), 733740.
Gill, David and Prowse, Victoria (2012): "Cognitive ability and learning to play equilib-
rium: A level-k analysis," working paper, Oxford University and Cornell University.
Grimm, Veronika, and Mengel, Friederike (2012): "An experiment on learning in a multiple
games environment," Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6), 22202259.
Hauge, Karen Evelyn, Brekke, Kjell Arne, Johansson, Lars-Olof, Johansson-Stenman, Olof,
and Svedsäter, Henrik (2009): "Are Social Preferences Skin Deep? Dictators under Cognitive
Load," working paper University of Gothenburg.
34
Hinson, John M., Jameson, Tina L., and Whitney, Paul (2002): "Somatic markers, working
memory, and decision making," Cognitive, A¤ective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 2 (4), 341
353.
Hinson, John M., Jameson, Tina L., and Whitney, Paul (2003): "Impulsive Decision
Making and Working Memory," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 29(2), 298306.
Jones, Garett (2008): "Are smarter groups more cooperative? Evidence from prisoners
dilemma experiments, 1959-2003," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68, 489
497.
Jones, Matthew T. (2011): "Strategic Complexity and Cooperation: An Experimental
Study," working paper, Ohio State University.
Kane, Michael J., Hambrick, David Z., and Conway, Andrew R. A. (2005): "Working
Memory Capacity and Fluid Intelligence Are Strongly Related Constructs: Comment on Ack-
erman, Beier, and Boyle (2005)," Psychological Bulletin, 131(1), 6671.
Kiss, H. J., Rodriguez-Lara, I., and Rosa-García, A. (2014): "Think Twice Before Running!
Bank Runs and Cognitive Abilities," working paper, Middlesex University.
Ma´ckowiak, Bartosz.and Wiederholt, Mirko (2009): "Optimal sticky prices under rational
inattention," American Economic Review, 99(3), 769803.
Mann, Traci and Ward, Andrew (2007): "Attention, Self-Control, and Health Behaviors,"
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16(5), 280283.
Milinski, Manfred, and Wedekind, Claus (1998): "Working memory constrains human
cooperation in the Prisoners Dilemma," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
95(23), 1375513758.
Millet, Kobe and Dewitte, Siegfried (2007): "Altruistic Behavior as a Costly Signal of
General Intelligence," Journal of Research in Personality, 41, 316326.
Nagel, Rosemarie (1995): "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,"
American Economic Review, 85(5), 13131326.
Oberauer, Klaus, Schulze, Ralf, Wilhelm, Oliver, and Süß, Heinz-Martin (2005): "Work-
ing Memory and Intelligence Their Correlation and Their Relation:Comment on Ackerman,
Beier, and Boyle (2005)," Psychological Bulletin, 131(1), 6165.
Oechssler, Jörg, Roider, Andreas and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2009): "Cognitive abilities and
behavioral biases," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72, 147152.
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio (2003) "Learning to Open Monty Halls Doors," Experimental
Economics, 6(3), 235251.
35
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio and Volij, Oscar (2009): "Field Centipedes," American Economic
Review, 99(4), 16191635.
Pan, Wei (2001): "Akaikes Information Criterion in Generalized Estimating Equations,"
Biometrics 57, 120125.
Persson, Petra (2012): "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," working pa-
per, Columbia University.
Proto, Eugenio, Rustichini, Aldo, and Soanos, Andis (2014): "Higher Intelligence Groups
Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma," working paper, Uni-
versity of Warwick.
Putterman, Louis, Tyran, Jean-Robert and Kamei, Kenju (2011): "Public goods and
voting on formal sanction schemes," Journal of Public Economics, 95, 12131222.
Reis, Ricardo (2006): "Inattentive consumers," Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, 1761
1800.
Rey-Biel, Pedro (2008): "Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Nor-
mal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 65(2), 572585.
Roch, Sylvia G., Lane, John A. S., Samuelson, Charles D., Allison, Scott T. and Dent,
Jennifer L. (2000): "Cognitive Load and the Equality Heuristic: A Two-Stage Model of
Resource Overconsumption in Small Groups," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 83(2), 185212.
Rydval, Ondrej (2011): "The Causal E¤ect of Cognitive Abilities on Economic Behavior:
Evidence from a Forecasting Task with Varying Cognitive Load," working paper, CERGE-EI.
Rydval, Ondrej and Ortmann, Andreas (2004): "How nancial incentives and cognitive
abilities a¤ect task performance in laboratory settings: an illustration," Economics Letters,
85, 315320.
Sanjurjo, Adam (2012a): "Search, Memory, and Choice: An Experiment," working paper,
University of Alacant.
Sanjurjo, Adam (2012b): "Using a Model of Memory Load to Explain Deviations from
Optimal Search," working paper, University of Alacant.
Schulz, Jonathan F., Fischbacher, Urs, Thöni, Christian, Utikal, Verena (2014): "A¤ect
and fairness: Dictator games under cognitive load," Journal of Economic Psychology, 41,
7787.
Schnusenberg, Oliver and Gallo, Andrés (2011): "On cognitive ability and learning in a
beauty contest," Journal for Economic Educators, 11(1), 1324.
36
Shiv, Baba and Fedorikhin, Alexander (1999): "Heart and Mind in Conict: The Interplay
of A¤ect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making," Journal of Consumer Research, 26(3),
278292.
Sims, Christopher (2003): "Implications of Rational Inattention," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50(3), 665690.
Slonim, Robert L. (2005): "Competing Against Experienced and Inexperienced Players,"
Experimental Economics, 8, 5575.
Stahl, Dale and Wilson, Paul (1994): "Experimental Evidence on PlayersModels of Other
Players," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25, 309327.
Stahl, Dale, and Wilson, Paul (1995): "On PlayersModels of Other Players: Theory and
Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 218254.
Süß, Heinz-Martin, Oberauer, Klaus, Wittmann, Werner W., Wilhelm, Oliver and Schulze,
Ralf (2002): "Working-memory capacity explains reasoning ability and a little bit more,"
Intelligence, 30(3), 261288.
Swann, William B., Hixon, Gregory, Stein-Seroussi, Alan, and Gilbert, Daniel T. (1990):
"The Fleeting Gleam of Praise: Cognitive Processes Underlying Behavioral Reactions to Self-
Relevant Feedback," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59 (1), 1726.
Van den Bos, Kees, Peters, Susanne L., Bobocel, D. Ramona, and Ybema, Jan Fekke
(2006): "On preferences and doing the right thing: Satisfaction with advantageous inequity
when cognitive processing is limited," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 273289.
Ward, Andrew and Mann, Traci (2000): "Dont Mind If I Do: Disinhibited Eating Under
Cognitive Load," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78 (4), 753763.
Wiederholt, Mirko (2010): "Rational Inattention," In The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, Online Edition, (Eds.) Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, Palgrave Macmillan.
37
